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Abstract
This paper investigates how trading frictions in asset markets aﬀect portfolio choices,
asset prices, eﬃciency and several measures of liquidity–such as bid-ask spreads, execution
delays and trade volume. To this end, we generalize the search-theoretic model of ﬁnancial
intermediation of Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) to allow for more general preferences
and idiosyncratic shock structure, unrestricted portfolio choices, aggregate uncertainty and
entry of ﬁnancial intermediaries (e.g., dealers). With a ﬁxed measure of dealers, we show
that a steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique, and provide a simple condition on
preferences under which a reduction in trading frictions will lead to an increase in the
price of the asset. We also analyze the eﬀects of trading frictions on bid-ask spreads, trade
volume and the volatility of asset prices. From a normative standpoint, we ﬁnd that the
asset allocation is constrained-ineﬃcient unless investors have all the bargaining power in
bilateral negotiations with dealers. We also study the model with entry of dealers–thereby
endogenizing the extent of the trading frictions–and show that the entry decision introduces
a feedback that can give rise to multiple equilibria. With entry, both the asset allocation
across investors and the number of dealers are socially ineﬃcient.
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Federal Reserve System.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Trading takes time. The trading delays (or “frictions”) which are at the foreground of the
economic modelling of many markets, such as labor markets, are also present in asset markets.
Even in equity and bond markets, where the trading arrangements are well developed, executing
a trade requires resources–time being one of them. An investor wishing to rebalance his
portfolio will usually contact a broker. In order to get the order executed, the broker will route
it to an organized exchange, to a dealer or market-maker, or to some electronic trading system.
Regardless of the method chosen, an order cannot be ﬁlled until a counterpart for the trade is
found, and ﬁnding a counterpart takes time.1
Markets for ﬁnancial securities have traditionally been the realm of the competitive Wal-
rasian paradigm. Accordingly, trade in these markets, e.g., the matching of buyers to sellers, is
typically regarded as an instantaneous and costless process–and left unmodeled. In this paper
we further the view that trading frictions and the mechanics of trade are important for under-
standing the functioning of asset markets, including many of those for ﬁnancial securities–and
especially ﬁxed-income securities–which are typically traded in a decentralized manner in over-
the-counter markets.
Financial markets are currently in the midst of a technological revolution that is poised
to reshape their structure and the ways in which they operate. The new electronic trading
systems being introduced allow brokers and dealers to match their orders faster. For example,
the advent of Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs)–private electronic screen-based
trading systems built around computer algorithms that match buy and sell orders through
an open limit-order book–is allowing investors to ﬁnd trading opportunities more rapidly,
and sometimes even directly, without the need for a traditional intermediary. Since traders
now have the option to submit orders to an ECN and trade with others directly instead of
1The time it takes to execute an order in an organized exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) or the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) can range
from a few seconds to several minutes. These delays vary considerably across market centers, see Boehmer (2005,
Table 6) and Boehmer, Jennings and Wei (2005, Table 2). To an outsider, diﬀerences in execution delays of a
few minutes may seem immaterial. But in a high-frequency marketplace where proﬁt opportunities come and
g ov e r yf a s t ,af e wm i n u t e s ,o re v e ns e c o n d s ,c a nm a k eab i gd i ﬀerence to some traders. Boehmer (2005, Table
4, Panel A) reports that the median eﬀective spread is 2.2 cents (0.09 percentage points of the price) larger in
NASDAQ than in the NYSE, but that on average, trades execute 12.2 seconds faster in NASDAQ. This seems
to suggest that traders are willing to pay a signiﬁcant amount to get a trade executed just a few seconds faster.
Trading delays tend to be longer–ranging from a few minutes to a day–for ﬁxed income securities traded in
over-the-counter markets, see Schultz (2001) and Saunders, Srinivasan and Walter (2002).
2having their trades intermediated by dealers, widespread use of these new technologies can
drastically reduce intermediation and transaction costs and accelerate trade execution.2 These
large transformations in trading arrangements are bound to manifest themselves in asset prices
and portfolio allocations and change the nature of ﬁnancial intermediation, but how exactly?
In this paper we develop an equilibrium search-theoretic model of the exchange process in
an asset market and use it to study how the degree of trading frictions–as determined by the
number of ﬁnancial intermediaries and available technologies–aﬀects the overall performance
of the market. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the eﬀects that these frictions have on portfolio alloca-
tions, intermediation costs (e.g., bid-ask spreads, intermediation fees), the level and volatility of
asset prices, various measures of liquidity (e.g., execution delays, trade volumes) and allocative
eﬃciency.
We build on the recent work of Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005), and similarly to their
work, our description of the asset market captures some salient features of over-the-counter
markets and telephone-dealer markets such as those for commercial paper and corporate bonds.
From a methodological point of view, we generalize the model in Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen
(2005) to allow for more general preferences and structure of idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate
uncertainty, unrestricted portfolio choices and entry of intermediaries. Keeping with the spirit
of the advent of electronic trading systems, in addition we allow investors to sometimes trade
directly with “the market,” without requiring the services of an intermediary.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model. Investors receive
idiosyncratic preference shocks that change their desired portfolios and are able to rebalance
their portfolios at random times. These random delays are meant to capture the order-execution
delays that investors or dealers experience while they try to ﬁnd a counterpart for the trade. In
contrast to investors, dealers have instantaneous access to a competitive interdealer market. In
intermediated trades, intermediation fees (or bid and ask prices) and portfolio allocations are
2These new technologies are already having a big impact in equity markets. For example, more than 50
percent of all NASDAQ trades (about 26 percent of the dollar trade volume in the year 2000 according to
NASDAQ, 2000) are now executed through ECNs. These technological innovations have been accompanied by
changes in regulations that promote competition among intermediaries. For instance, the New Order Handling
Rules introduced by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1997 impose that the public orders posted
on ECNs can compete more directly with NASDAQ market-makers. (See McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2000 for
an account of the emergence of ECNs in U.S. equity markets and Barclay et al, 1999 pp. 4—7 for a detailed
description of the SEC order-handling reforms.) The number of electronic trading systems for ﬁxed-incomes
securities has also proliferated from 11 in 1997, to 70 in 2000. It is estimated that in the year 2000, 40 percent
of U.S. Treasury securities transactions were done electronically, up twofold from 1999 (see Allen, Hawkins and
Sato, 2001).
3determined jointly through bargaining in a bilateral match between an investor and a dealer.
Alternatively, when an investor gains direct access to the asset market, he chooses his new
portfolio taking the asset price parametrically and pays no intermediation fee.
In Section 3 we study the model with a constant measure of dealers and show that a
steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique. In Section 3.1 we extend the model to allow for
aggregate uncertainty. Section 3.2 presents a calibrated version of the model used to illustrate
and complement our analytical results.
Section 4 deals with the eﬀects of trading frictions on asset prices. In Section 4.1 we show
that for CRRA preferences, the price of the asset increases (decreases) as trading frictions are
reduced if the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is smaller (larger) than one. For a logarithmic
utility function the asset price is independent of trading frictions and corresponds to the price
that would prevail in a frictionless Walrasian market. In Section 4.2 we use the formulation
with aggregate uncertainty to study the eﬀects of trading frictions on asset-price volatility.
Section 5 deals with the eﬀects that the degree of trading frictions has on the volume of
trade and the allocation of portfolios across investors. In Section 6 we show that intermediation
fees are trade-speciﬁc and increase with the size of the portfolio reallocations. For a given trade
size, fees increase with dealers’ bargaining power and decrease with the frequency at which
investors can access the market directly, as well as with the frequency at which they can meet
dealers. Interestingly, since a reduction in the trading frictions increases the size of each trade,
faster trading does not necessarily reduce the dealers’ average proﬁt.
In Section 7 we endogenize trading delays by allowing entry of dealers. We show that an
equilibrium exists, but ﬁnd that it need not be unique. We provide examples where multiple
(e.g., three) steady states exist. This multiplicity arises because of a strategic complementarity
between the investors’ portfolio choices and the dealers’ entry decisions. When multiple equilib-
ria exist, some exhibit narrow bid-ask spreads, large traded volumes and short execution delays,
while others display wide spreads, small volumes and long delays. We show that a reduction in
trading frictions can remove the multiplicity. Thus, perhaps counter to intuition, it is possible
that a regulatory reform or a technological innovation that gives investors more direct access
to the asset market (such as ECNs) leads to a relatively large increase in market liquidity and
results in a higher volume of intermediated trades.3
3Concerns have been raised that increased competition from alternative trading networks could reduce dealers’
incentives to make markets, and hence adversely aﬀect the liquidity of the market. Since the growth of electronic
trading platforms is a very recent phenomenon, there is only a handful of academic studies that examine their
4Finally, in Section 8 we carry out a normative analysis. We establish that portfolio decisions
tend to be ineﬃcient because of a holdup problem introduced by bargaining. Investors with
high valuations tend to invest too little, while those with low valuations tend to invest too
much. This ineﬃciency is eliminated when dealers have no market power. When there is entry
of dealers, the measure of dealers is eﬃcient if the bargaining power of dealers coincides with
their contribution to the matching process. Therefore, in this context, the ineﬃciencies on
the intensive margin (portfolio choices) and extensive margin (number of dealers) cannot be
corrected simultaneously.
In terms of related work, our paper belongs to the new search-theoretic literature on ﬁnan-
cial markets that includes Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005), Mia (2004), Rust and Hall
(2003), Vayanos and Wang (2002), Weill (2005a,b) and Gârleanu (2005).4 Relative to these
papers, our methodological contribution consist of: (i) relaxing the portfolio restrictions5,( ii)
allowing for more general preferences and more general forms of investor heterogeneity, (iii)
allowing for aggregate uncertainty, (iv) allowing investors direct, as well as indirect (i.e., dealer-
intermediated) access to a competitive interdealer market, and (v) endogenizing the degree of
the trading frictions by endogenizing the measure of dealers.6 These generalizations yield new
insights, e.g., on the link between trading frictions and the level and volatility of asset prices,
on the potential for multiple equilibria, on the eﬃciency implications of the degree of market
power of dealers, and on the size of intermediation fees as a function of the trade-size and the
degree of trading frictions. From an applied standpoint, taken together, the generalizations we
develop also allow us to address new issues, such as the impact that the emergence and growth
of ECNs and other alternative trading systems will have on bid-ask spreads, trade volumes, the
eﬀects. Weston (2000, 2002), for instance, ﬁnds that the increase in competition resulting from the growth of
trading through ECNs in NASDAQ has resulted in larger trade volumes, tighter bid-ask spreads and net entry
of market-makers. See Weston (2002) for references to related work.
4Also related is the work of Spulber (1996), who considers a search environment where middlemen intermediate
trade between heterogenous buyers and sellers. There is also a large related literature, not search-based, which
studies how exogenously speciﬁed transaction costs aﬀect the functioning of asset markets. Recent examples
include He and Modest (1995), Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2004), Luttmer (1996) and Vayanos (1998), to name
a few. See Heaton and Lucas (1995) for a survey of this body of work.
5As in the early search-theoretic models of money, e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Duﬃe, Gârleanu and
Pedersen (2005) restrict portfolio choices to lie in the set {0,1}. We impose no restrictions on the quantity of
assets that an investor can hold except that it be nonnegative (i.e., we do not allow for short-selling of assets).
Also as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) allow for bilateral trades between
investors. In our model, investors can trade directly with other investors every time they gain direct access to
the competitive market–but these trades are not bilateral.
6Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) consider a search intensity decision by a monopolist dealership, while
we model a market with many small dealers who compete with each other for order ﬂow.
5number of ﬁnancial intermediaries and execution delays.
2 The environment
Time is continuous and the horizon inﬁnite. There are two types of inﬁnitely-lived agents: a
unit measure of investors and a unit measure of dealers. (We endogenize the measure of dealers
in Section 7.) There is one asset and one perishable good which we use as numeraire. The asset
is durable and perfectly divisible. The stock of assets in the economy is A ∈ R+.T h en u m e r a i r e
good is produced and consumed by all agents. The instantaneous utility function of an investor
is U(a,c;i)=ui(a)+c,w h e r ea ∈ R+ represents the investor’s asset holdings, c ∈ R is the
net consumption of the numeraire good (c<0 if the investor produces more of these goods
than he consumes), and i ∈ {1,...,I} indexes a preference shock. The utility function ui(a)
is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.7 Each investor receives
a preference shock with Poisson arrival rate δ. This process is independent across investors.
Conditional on the preference shock, the probability the investor draws preference type i is πi,
with
PI
i=1 πi =1 . These preference shocks capture the notion that investors will value the
services provided by the asset diﬀerently over time thereby generating a need for investors to
reallocate their portfolios. Dealers cannot hold positions and their instantaneous utility is c,
their consumption of the numeraire good.8 All agents discount at rate r>0.
There is a competitive market for the asset and dealers have continuous access to it. An
investor can access this market indirectly through a dealer. Investors contact dealers at random
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α. Once they have contacted each other, the
dealer and the investor negotiate over the quantity of assets that the dealer will acquire for the
investor and over the intermediation fee that the investor will pay the dealer for his services.
After the transaction has been completed, the dealer and the investor part ways. Investors can
also gain direct access to the competitive asset market according to an independent Poisson
process with arrival rate β. The trading process is illustrated in Figure 1.
We regard this theoretical trading process as a stylized characterization of actual trading
7One can think of the asset as being a durable good that provides a ﬂow of services to its owner, such as a
house or a car. Also, a could be thought of as shares of a “tree” that yield a real, perishable “fruit” dividend
diﬀerent from the numeraire good. Alternatively, one may adopt the interpretation of Duﬃe, Gârleanu and
Pedersen (2005) and consider ui (a) as a reduced-form utility function that stands for the various motives an
investor may have for holding the asset, such liquidity or hedging needs.
8The restriction that dealers cannot hold assets is of no consequence when analyzing steady-state equilibria,
as we do in most of the paper. See Weill (2005a) for dynamic equilibria where dealers hold positions.
































Figure 1: Trading process
arrangements in some asset markets. We think of the investors in the model as representing
investor-broker pairs who are searching for a counterpart to execute a given trade. A counter-
part can typically be found in a traditional intermediary, such as a dealer or market-maker, or
through electronic trading systems that allow investors to trade directly without an interme-
diary. Finding a counterpart by either method involves delays. In the model, these execution
delays correspond to 1/α and 1/β. Bilateral trade and bargaining between investors/brokers
and dealers is a feature of many ﬁnancial transactions, both in quote-driven and order-driven
markets. The fact that agents trade assets at a competitive price when they gain access to the
market captures the idea that even though there are execution delays, investors and dealers
sometimes interact in large groups and in these instances, they take prices as given.
2.1 Discussion
While our theoretical model is stylized, we believe it captures the salient features of many
ﬁnancial trades in various contexts. First, as Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) emphasize,
the model incorporates the key elements of over-the-counter (OTC) markets. The deﬁning
feature of OTC markets is that they have no formal organization: they do not have a physical
location and operate in a completely decentralized manner. A typical OTC market consists of
brokers and dealers who can be located all over the country and negotiate directly with one
another over computer networks and by telephone. Unlisted stocks, some derivatives and most
debt instruments, such as commercial paper, corporate and municipal bonds, are examples of
7securities traded over the counter.
Trade in an OTC market is a textbook search problem: buyers and sellers seek each other
out and usually trade in pairs. An investor wishing to trade an OTC security will contact,
electronically or by phone, dealers who are specialized in that particular asset category. It
typically takes a dealer several minutes to generate a quote. After the dealer produces the
initial quote, negotiations will ensue regarding the price quoted and other details of the trade,
in particular the quantity traded.9 In the model, 1/α has a natural interpretation as the average
time it takes the investor/broker to ﬁnd a dealer with whom they reach an agreement regarding
the terms of the trade. Another key feature of OTC markets is that dealers have access to
interdealer brokered networks where they can manage their inventories. In this spirit, dealers
in our model have access to a competitive asset market where they can continuously manage
their asset positions.10
In some cases, even listed securities may get traded OTC-style, i.e., in a decentralized dealer
network, bilaterally, and with negotiated prices and quantities. Such is the case for large blocks
of stocks and some treasuries. Although these securities may trade in organized exchanges
for small sizes, brokers routinely have to ﬁnd suitable counterparts for large blocks. The ﬁrst
problem that block traders face is searching for traders with these latent demands, and once
they have found them, the terms of the transaction will be negotiated bilaterally.11
Bilateral trade with negotiated prices and quantities are also features of some transactions
conducted in the context of organized exchanges. For instance, trade in quote-driven dealer-
organized markets such as NASDAQ is also bilateral, either between two registered dealers–
market-makers–or between an investor/broker and a market-maker. Regarding the terms of
trade, market-makers are typically required to post prices at which they are willing to buy (the
bid price) and sell (the ask price) some quantity of the instrument they are registered for. In
principle, these price quotes can be soft or ﬁrm.D e a l e r sw h oo ﬀer soft quotes can revise their
9See Harris (2003) for examples and detailed accounts of real-world trades and Schultz (2001) or Saunders,
Srinivasan and Walter (2002) for a description of over-the-counter corporate bond markets.
10Our competitive interdealer market allows dealers to intermediate transactions instantaneously without hav-
ing to take positions, and hence, without having to assume inventory risk. In reality, in addition to intermediating
between investors, some dealers–position traders–take positions in the hope of making capital gains. In this
paper we abstract from this inventory risk. But there are also pure spread traders, i.e., dealers who–like the
ones in our model–don’t take positions, and proﬁt exclusively from buying low and selling high.
11As an example, the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) introduced a
block trading facility in April 1999. LIFFE’s block trading procedures permit its members and their qualiﬁed
clients to quickly trade large blocks at bilaterally negotiated prices.
8prices when asked to trade, or even refuse to trade. Soft quotes lead to bargaining. Firm quotes
are only good up to the quantity that the dealer speciﬁes in the quote, so they may also coexist
with elements of bargaining.12
Nowadays, listed stocks also trade in various alternative trading systems–ECNs being the
best known among these electronic exchanges. Accordingly, another key feature of modern
ﬁnancial exchanges that we try to capture in our formal modelling is that, for many securities,
markets overlap. That is, when a broker receives a trade order for a particular security, he
can route it to a traditional dealer or exchange, or to an alternative trading system. The
direct access to the asset market that we grant investors in our formal modelling is meant
to capture the trade opportunities created by these alternative trading systems that match
investors directly. For example, 1/β in the model can be thought of as the average time it takes
f o ram a r k e to r d e rt oﬁll when routed through an electronic trading system such as an ECN.13
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize stationary equilibria where the joint distribution of portfolios and
preferences across investors remains constant over time. Consider an investor with a preference





πk [Vk(a) − Vi(a)] + α[Vi(ab
i) − Vi(a) − p(ab





i) − Vi(a) − p(ac
i − a)], (1)
for a ∈ R+ and i =1 ,...,I. A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,t h ei n v e s t o re n j o y sau t i l i t yﬂow ui(a) from
holding portfolio a. He receives a new preference shock with instantaneous probability δ,a n d
conditional on this shock, he draws a new preference type k with probability πk and enjoys a
12NASDAQ requires its dealers to quote ﬁr mt w o - s i d e dm a r k e t s ,i . e . ,b o t hab i da n da na s kp r i c e ,f o ra tl e a s t
100 shares of the security they are registered for. Notwithstanding, it is not uncommon for dealers to trade at
diﬀerent prices than those they quote to the public. This happens because market-maker’s posted prices are only
binding up to the quantities speciﬁed in the quote, so a trader wishing to trade a larger quantity will end up
negotiating the terms of the trade bilaterally with the dealer.
13In reality, the cost to sending an order to an ECN is usually small compared to the fees or spreads charged by
traditional dealers. For this reason, the cost of trading directly in the asset market is normalized to zero in the
model. Many interdealer markets are now open to investors (e.g., the trading platforms BrokerTec and E-Speed).
Accordingly, in our formal model, the market where investors can trade directly without being intermediated by
dealers is the same interdealer market where dealers rebalance their asset holdings. Nothing would change if we
modelled them as being distinct marketplaces.
9capital gain Vk(a) − Vi(a). With instantaneous probability α, the investor meets a dealer who
can help him rebalance his portfolio. Upon contacting a dealer, the investor buys ab
i − a (sells
if negative) and pays the dealer a fee φi (a) ∈ R+ (in terms of the numeraire good) in exchange
for the dealer’s intermediation services. Both the quantity traded, ab
i, and the fee, φi (a), will
be determined through a bilateral bargaining procedure between the dealer and the investor.14
We use p ∈ R+ to denote the price of the asset in the competitive market (also expressed in
terms of the numeraire good). With instantaneous probability β the investor gains direct access
to the competitive asset market and he simply chooses a new portfolio ac
i at cost p(ac
i − a).




where H(a,i) is the distribution of portfolios and preference types across investors. A dealer
meets an investor with instantaneous probability α. Random matching implies that this investor
is a random draw from the population of all investors. Thus, (2) simply equates the ﬂow value
of a dealer to the expected intermediation fee.
We now turn to the determination of the intermediation fee and the quantity of assets
traded in a meeting between a dealer and an investor of type i who holds portfolio a.T h e
change in the investor’s portfolio, ab
i −a, and the payment to the dealer, φi(a),a r et a k e nt ob e
the outcome corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining problem where the dealer has
bargaining power η ∈ [0,1]. The utility of an investor if an agreement (ab − a,φ) is reached is
Vi(ab) − p(ab − a) − φ. In case of disagreement, the utility of the investor is Vi(a). Therefore,
the investor’s surplus is Vi(ab) −Vi(a) − p(ab −a) −φ. The dealer’s surplus is equal to the fee,
φ. Hence, the outcome of the bargaining is given by15
(ab
i,φ i)=a r gm a x
(a0,φ)
[Vi(a0) − Vi(a) − p(a0 − a) − φ]1−ηφη. (3)
The following lemma characterizes the bargaining solution given the value functions {Vi}
I
i=1.
14Our notation reﬂects the fact that both the new portfolio and the intermediation fee may depend on the
preference type of the investor at the time he contacts the dealer. In principle, these variables may also depend
the investor’s wealth, but anticipating Lemma 1, we do not make this dependence explicit in our notation for
the new portfolio.
15Note that it would be equivalent to set φ =( ˆ p − p)(a
b − a) and reformulate the bargaining problem as a
choice of (a
b − a),t h es i z eo ft h eo r d e r ,a n dˆ p, the transaction price charged or paid by the dealer. So if a
b >a
then the investor is a buyer and ˆ p>pcan be interpreted as the ask price charged by the dealer. Conversely, if
a
b <athen the investor is a seller and ˆ p<pis the bid price paid by the dealer.
10Lemma 1 The outcome of the bargaining problem (3) is (ab
i,φ i)=[ ai,φ i(a)],w h e r e
ai =a r gm a x
a0 [Vi(a0) − pa0], (4)
φi(a)=η max
a0 [Vi(a0) − Vi(a) − p(a0 − a)]. (5)
According to Lemma 1, the quantity of assets the investor buys, ai − a,i sc h o s e ns oa s
to maximize the total surplus of a match and the intermediation fee, φi(a), is set to split the
surplus of the match according to each agent’s bargaining power. From (4), it is immediate
that the investor’s new portfolio, ai, is independent of a. Interestingly, from the last term of
(1), it is clear that investors choose the same portfolio, ai, regardless of whether their trade is





πj [Vj(a) − Vi(a)] + κmax
a0 [Vi(a0) − Vi(a) − p(a0 − a)], (6)
where κ ≡ α(1 − η)+β can be thought of as the rate at which the investor gains eﬀective
direct access to the asset market.
So far we have characterized the bargaining outcome for given value functions and provided
the maximizers corresponding to the right-hand sides of (4) and (5) exist. The following lemma
establishes that the value functions exist, are unique, strictly increasing and strictly concave,
that the ai deﬁned in (4) is unique and that the φi (a) g i v e ni n( 5 )i sw e l l - d e ﬁned. For the
analysis that follows, it will be convenient to deﬁne:
Ui (a)=
r + κ
r + δ + κ
ui(a)+
δ




Lemma 2 For each i, suppose that ui (a)−rpa is continuous and bounded above for any rp > 0.




Ui (a)+κ(pa + Ωi)
r + κ
, (8)




j πj∆j,a n d∆i =m a x x [Ui (x) − rpx].
Combining (4) and (8) we ﬁnd that ai, the optimal portfolio of an investor with preference
type i, is the one that achieves the value ∆i in Lemma 2. Hence, ai satisﬁes:
U0
i (ai) ≤ rp,“ = ”i f ai > 0.( 9 )
11Condition (9), states that an investor who wishes to hold the asset in state i chooses his optimal
portfolio so that the expected (conditional on being in state i) discounted sum of ﬂow marginal
utility from holding the portfolio until the next time it is adjusted, i.e.,
U0
i(a)
r+κ , equals p − κ
r+κp,
namely the cost of buying an additional unit of the asset and holding it until the next time it
c a nb es o l db a c ki nt h ec o m p e t i t i v em a r k e t .
From (7) we see that U0
i (a) is a weighted average of the marginal utilities in the various
states. The weights on the current marginal utility and future ones depend on the transition







k(ai),t h e n∂ai/∂α > 0 and ∂ai/∂β > 0:
The investor’s demand for the asset increases as trading frictions are reduced. As α or β
increases, it becomes easier for investors to sell parts of their portfolios in case of an adverse
preference shock. Therefore, the investor’s demand for the asset increases in those states in





k(ai), i.e., if his marginal utility in the current state is below
average, then ∂ai/∂α < 0 and ∂ai/∂β < 0.A sα or β goes to inﬁnity, Ui (a) → ui (a),a n dt h e
optimal portfolio tends to the ai that solves u0
i(ai) ≤ rp, namely the portfolio choice that would
prevail in a competitive market where all trades can be executed instantaneously.16
We now turn to the determination of the intermediation fee that an agent in state i who
is holding portfolio a pays the dealer who readjusts his portfolio. From (5), this fee satisﬁes
φi(a)=η[Vi(ai) − Vi(a) − p(ai − a)],w i t hai characterized by (9). Using (8),
φi(a)=
η[Ui (ai) − Ui (a) − rp(ai − a)]
r + κ
. (10)
The intermediation fee depends on the dealer’s bargaining power, η, the discount factor, r,a n d
the transition rates α, β and δ. It also varies with the investor’s asset position at the time the
trade is executed, a,a sw e l la sw i t hh i sd e s i r e dp o r t f o l i o ,ai.
Next, we characterize the steady-state distribution H(a,i). The individual state of an
investor is a pair (a,i) ∈ R+ ×{ 0,...,I},w h e r ea is his current portfolio and i his preference
type. First, note that any state (a,i) such that a 6= aj for j ∈ {1,...,I} is transient, since
whenever an investor adjusts his portfolio he chooses a ∈ {ak}I
k=1. Thus, the set of ergodic





for i 6= j. Speciﬁcally, investors with relatively low current marginal valuations, i.e., those with preference types






k(ai), hold positions that are too large relative to their optimal portfolios in the
frictionless benchmark. And similarly, investors with high current marginal valuations hold positions that are
too small.
12states is {ak}I
k=1×{1,...,I}. This allows us to simplify the exposition by denoting state (ai,j) ∈
{ak}I
k=1×{1,...,I} by ij ∈ {1,...,I}2.H e n c e ,f o rs t a t eij, i represents the portfolio the investor
currently has (i.e., the one corresponding to the preference shock he had at the time he last
rebalanced his portfolio), and j represents his current preference shock. The measure of investors
in state ij is denoted nij.












nik − δ(1 − πi)nii =0 . (12)
According to (11), the measure of investors in state ij (j 6= i) increases whenever an investor in
some state ik receives a preference shock j (which occurs with instantaneous probability δπj)
and decreases whenever an investor in state ij receives a new preference shock diﬀerent from j
(which happens with instantaneous probability δ(1−πj)), or whenever such an investor readjusts
his portfolio (either through a dealer, with instantaneous probability α, or by accessing the asset
market directly, with instantaneous probability β). Equation (12) has a similar interpretation.
The pattern of ﬂows between states is depicted in Figure 2 for an example with I =3 .E a c hc i r c l e
represents an individual state. The horizontal arrows represent ﬂows due to preference shocks
whereas the vertical ones indicate ﬂows due to portfolio readjustments. On the diagonal, the
individual states shaded in grey are those for which there is no mismatch between the investor’s
current preference type and the portfolio he holds. The following lemma characterizes the
stationary distribution of preference shocks and asset holdings.
Lemma 3 The steady-state distribution (nij)I
i,j=1 is given by
nij =
δπiπj
α + β + δ
, for j 6= i, (13)
nii =
δπ2
i +( α + β)πi
α + β + δ
. (14)
The marginal distributions ni· =
P
j nij and n·j =
P
i nij are ni· = n·i = πi, i.e., the
measure of investors with preference type i is equal to πi, the probability to draw preference










































Figure 2: Flows between individual investor states
across states is symmetric, nij = nji.A l s o ,∂nij/∂(α + β) < 0 if j 6= i and ∂nii/∂(α + β) > 0,
i.e., the measure of investors who are matched to their desired portfolio increases as the rate at
which investors get to rebalance their portfolios, either directly or through dealers, increases.
So far we have characterized the optimal portfolio choice, ai, for an investor of type i,w i t h
asset position a,t h ef e eφi (a) that the investor pays if the trade is intermediated by a dealer and
the steady state distribution of investors across asset holdings and preference types. The only
remaining equilibrium variable to be determined is p, the price of the asset in the competitive
market. This price is the one that equilibrates demand and supply of assets, i.e., the one that
implies
P
i,j nijai = A. Using Lemma 3, this market-clearing condition can be written as
X
i
πiai = A. (15)
A steady-state equilibrium is a list {(nij)
I
i,j=1 ,(ai,φ i (·))
I
i=1 ,p} such that: (nij)
I
i,j=1 satisﬁes
(13) and (14), (ai,)
I
i=1 and p satisfy (9) and (15), and (φi (·))
I
i=1 satisﬁes (10).
Proposition 1 There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium.
14The distribution of investors over portfolios and preference types is given by (13) and (14).
The individual portfolio choices (ai) in (9) depend on p, the equilibrium price in the interdealer
market. Given these individual demands, the market-clearing condition (15) determines a
unique price.
H e r e a f t e r ,u n l e s si ti ss p e c i ﬁed otherwise, suppose ui is such that (9) holds at equality (e.g.,
suppose that lima→0 u0
i (a)=∞ for some i.) To illustrate how a reduction in trading frictions
aﬀects the equilibrium, we consider ﬁrst the limiting case where search frictions vanish, i.e., as
either α →∞or β →∞ . In either case investors can trade in the asset market continuously, as
they can either ﬁnd dealers instantly (if α = ∞) or have continuous direct access to the asset









i (rp)=A. From (10) we see that φi (a) → 0 for all a and i.T h e
limiting distribution of investors across asset holdings and preference types is nii = πi for each
i,a n dnij =0for j 6= i. As frictions vanish, investors choose ai continuously by equating the
present discounted value of the marginal return from the asset to its price. The equilibrium fee,
asset price and distribution of asset positions are the ones that would prevail in a Walrasian
economy.17
Another interesting limiting case results when η =1(dealers have all the bargaining power).




r + β + δ
ui(a)+
δ




Since investors enjoy no gains from readjusting their portfolios in trades intermediated by
dealers, the demand for assets is the one that would prevail in an economy with α =0 .T h e
liquidity provided by dealers is irrelevant for investors’ portfolio choices and investors behave
as if there were no dealers to alleviate the trading frictions.
17For related limiting results, see Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pederson (2005) and Miao (2005). In a diﬀerent context,
see Gale (1987) and Spulber (1996).
153.1 Aggregate uncertainty
We now extend the model to allow for aggregate uncertainty. Suppose the economy can be in
one of two states: a high state (H) in which every investor of preference type i enjoys utility
uH
i (a) from holding portfolio a and a low state (L) in which every investor of preference type
i enjoys utility uL
i (a) from the same portfolio, with ∂uL
i (a)/∂a < ∂uH
i (a)/∂a. The aggregate
state changes according to a continuous-time Markov chain: while in state s ∈ {H,L},t h et i m e
until the next switch to the other state s0 is an exponentially distributed random variable with
mean 1/λs. So, for example, if we associate state H with “normal times” and state L with
“times of crisis,” a small λH means that crises are very infrequent, and a large λL that they
tend to be short-lived. We specialize the analysis to stochastic steady states where ni (t)=πi
for all t.L e tps denote the price of the asset when the aggregate state is s.
Let V s
i (a) denote the value of an investor with preference type i when the aggregate state







j (a) − V s
i (a)] + λs[V s0




i (a0) − V s
i (a) − ps(a0 − a)]}, (17)
for i =1 ,...,I, s = H,L and s0 ∈ {H,L}\{s}. The novelty in (17) is the third term on the
right side, which captures the capital gain associated with a change in the aggregate state.
The investor’s problem can be characterized following a similar method to the one we used in





















(1/λs)(r+κ+λ)(r+κ+δ+λ) ,f o rs = H,L and s0 ∈ {H,L}\{s}.T h e
following lemma summarizes the portfolio problem that investors face in this environment.
Lemma 4 An investor with preference type i ∈ {1,...,I} who gains access to the asset market









ξs = rps −
κλs
r + λ + κ
(ps0
− ps), (19)





r+κ is the present expected discounted utility that the investor obtains from
holding as
i over the period of time that elapses until he is next able to rebalance his portfolio,
while
ξs
r+κ is the cost of purchasing a unit of the asset today, net of its expected discounted
resale value at the next time he regains access to the market.18 Thus, the portfolio choice of






≤ ξs,“ = ”i f as
i > 0.( 2 0 )
In order to characterize the price of the asset in each state, we turn to the market-clearing
condition. The ﬂow of assets brought by investors who access the market, directly or through a
dealer, is (α + β)
R
adHt(a,i)=( α + β)A. Among those investors, a fraction πi of them have








i = A,f o rs = H,L. (21)
Since (20) gives as
i as a function of ξs, (21) can be solved for the pair (ξH,ξL), and given this






r(r + κ)(r + λ)
(ξs − ξs0
), (22)
for s = H,L and s0 ∈ {H,L}\{s}. The intermediation fee borne by an investor of preference
type i who purchases (as
i − a) through a dealer at a time when the aggregate state is s,s a t i s ﬁes
a generalized version of (5), φs
i(a)=η[V s
i (as
i) − V s
i (a) − ps (as
i − a)]. We can substitute V s
i (·)





















i=1;g i v e n(ξs)s=H,L, as
i satisﬁes (20) for all i, s; (ξs)s=H,L satisfy (21); (ps)s=H,L
are given by (22); and φs
i (·) satisﬁes (23) for all i and s. It is possible to show that a stationary














w(T)], where the expectation is over the random variables T and w(T) ∈
{H,L}, namely the length of time until the date at which the investor will regain access to the market and the
aggregate state that will prevail at that date. (The subscript indicates that the expectation is conditional on the
current aggregate state, s, see the appendix for details.)
173.2 Numerical analysis
In this section we parametrize the model and use it, here and in subsequent sections, to illustrate
and complement our analytical results. We let a unit of time correspond to a day and normalize
the stock of assets, A =1 . We take the rate of time preference to be 7 percent per year, i.e.,
r =1 .07
1
360 − 1. As a benchmark, we consider a pure dealer market where all trades are
intermediated by dealers, i.e., we set β =0(we experiment with a wide range of values for β
in Sections 6 and 7). The average delay of execution for a trade intermediated by a dealer is
taken to be one day, i.e., α =1 .19 We set δ =1so that investors receive preference shocks at
the same rate as they encounter trade opportunities. We assume the negotiating parties have
equal bargaining power, i.e., η =0 .5.W e l e t ui (a)=εia1−σ/(1 − σ) and take σ =2as our
baseline, but will report some results for various values of σ. The support for the values of εi is
{ i−1
I−1}I
i=1 with I =5 0 . Our choice of I implies that investors will be distributed among 2,500
individual states. The preference shock εi = i−1




j=1 λj−1/(j − 1)!
, for i =1 ,...,I. (24)
The parameter λ from this truncated Poisson distribution plays a key role to determine the size
distribution of trades and intermediation fees. We choose λ =4 . This parametrization implies
a yearly turnover rate for the asset that is close to 8 and an average eﬀective volume-weighted
spread of about 0.2 b a s i sp o i n t so ft h ea s s e tp r i c e . 20
Figure 3 illustrates some key features of our economy. The distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks is plotted on the top-left panel. The top-right panel shows investors’ choices of portfolios
as a function of the realization of their individual preference shock. Not too surprisingly, ai
increases with εi. The bottom-left panel is a three-dimensional histogram of the equilibrium
stationary distribution of investors over individual states, i.e., (nij)
I
i,j=1. The investor’s desired
19According to Sanders, Srinivasan and Walter (2002, p. 97), trading delays in corporate bond markets range
f r o mam i n u t et oad a y .
20This value for the eﬀective spread is smaller than estimates found in the literature–see Schultz (2001),
for instance. One reason is that our model abstracts from other components of the bid-ask spread such as
inventory costs and costs associated with asymmetric information between dealers and investors. The expression
for the average bid-ask spread, weighted by volume and expressed as a proportion of the price of the asset,
is given in (33). (See Section 6 for more on spreads.) The turnover in the model is deﬁned as follows. The
ﬂow of investors who can readjust their portfolios per unit of time is α + β.A f r a c t i o n nji of these investors
readjust their portfolio from aj to ai so that the quantity they trade is |ai − aj|. Thus, the turnover rate is
T = A
−1 P
i,j (1/2)(α + β)nji|ai − aj|. Our turnover rate is in the same range as the turnover for the entire
market for US public and private debt. The outstanding debt is $15.8 trillion while the daily trading volume is
$368 billion so that the daily turnover rate is 0.023, or about 8 yearly (see Joys, 2001).
18portfolio lies on the x axis, and his current portfolio on the y axis. Both axes range from a1
to aI, which in this parametrization equal 0.82 and 2.19, respectively. There is a fairly large
concentration of agents on the main diagonal, i.e., many investors hold their optimal portfolio.
Visually, this is the spike that imitates the shape of the primitive distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks. But note that there is also a signiﬁcant proportion of agents experiencing various
degrees of mismatch with their current portfolios, precisely 43% of them. The bottom-right
panel plots the fees φij. Notice that fees are 0 on the main diagonal (φii =0 ) and that they
increase as ai (the current portfolio) and aj (the new portfolio) get further apart. Also, buy-
and sell- fees are not symmetric.
Figure 3: The baseline economy
4 Asset prices
In this section we discuss the eﬀects of parameter changes on the level and volatility of asset
prices. We will pay special attention to α and β, which we interpret as measures of execution
delays. We specialize the analysis to utility functions of the form ui(a)=εiu(a). For this class
19of preferences, Ui (a)=¯ εiu(a),w h e r e¯ εi =
(r+κ)εi+δ¯ ε
r+δ+κ and ¯ ε =
P
j πjεj. Focusing on interior
solutions, (9) reduces to
¯ εiu0(a)=rp.( 2 5 )
4.1 Level
Diﬀerentiating (25) for a given p,w eﬁnd that ∂ai/∂α has the same sign as (εi − ¯ ε).T h a ti s ,
investors with a preference shock above average increase their demand when α increases. To
see why this is so, note that the left side of (25) is a weighted sum of the investor’s marginal
utility from holding the asset. Agents with εi > ¯ ε have a current marginal utility that is higher
than what they expect it to be in the future. Consequently, their choice of ai is lower than
u0−1 (rp/εi), which is what they would choose in a world with no trading delays. The reason is
that, since εi is higher than ¯ ε, the investor anticipates that his preferences are likely to revert
toward ¯ ε in the future, and that when this happens, he may be unable to rebalance his portfolio
for some time. A larger α m e a n st h a ti tw i l lb ee a s i e rf o rt h ei n v e s t o rt oﬁnd a dealer in the
future, and this makes him put more weight on his current marginal utility from holding the
asset relative to its expected value. Conversely, investors with a preference shock below average
reduce their demand when α increases. So, for given p,a sα increases the dispersion of asset
holdings increases. The same logic applies to changes in β, and for similar reasons, ∂ai/∂δ has
t h es a m es i g na s−(εi − ¯ ε).
Since for a given price p, the demands of investors with relatively low valuations (εi < ¯ ε)
fall, while those of investors with high valuations (εi > ¯ ε)r i s e ,t h ee ﬀect of an increase in α
on the aggregate demand for assets–and therefore on the equilibrium price of the asset–is
ambiguous in general. The following proposition provides suﬃcient conditions for the price of
the asset to increase with α.
Proposition 2 If −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is strictly increasing in a,t h e ndp/dα > 0.I f−[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a)
is strictly decreasing in a,t h e ndp/dα < 0.I f −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is independent of a,t h e n
dp/dα =0 .
Whether an increase in α has a positive eﬀect on the asset price depends on the curvature of
the utility function. The reason is that this curvature determines the curvature of the individual
demand for the asset as a function of ¯ εi, i.e., ∂ai/∂¯ εi = −[u0(ai)]
2 /[u00(ai)rp].I fu(a)=l o ga
then ai is linear in ¯ εi, and as one aggregates the individual changes in demands induced by an
20increase in α, the increases in ai (for investors with values of εi larger than ¯ ε) and the decreases
in ai (for investors with values of εi lower than ¯ ε) cancel each other out. As a result, α has no
eﬀect on the aggregate demand for assets nor on the equilibrium price.21 If u is not too concave,
ai is a convex function of ¯ εi. For this case, the increases in ai for relatively large values of εi
outweight the decreases in ai for relatively low values of εi and the aggregate demand for the
asset increases in response to an increase in α. In turn, this implies that the equilibrium price
of the asset increases with α. Conversely, the asset price is decreasing in α if u is suﬃciently
concave.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot the individual demand for the asset,
ai, as a function of ¯ εi for the special case of I =2 .T h eﬁgure is drawn under the assumption
that −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is strictly increasing in a,s ot h a tai is a strictly convex function of ¯ εi.
Notice that π1¯ ε1 + π2¯ ε2 =¯ ε and that π1a1 + π2a2 = A in equilibrium. An increase in α
corresponds to a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the distribution of ¯ εi,i . e . ,¯ εi shifts
to ¯ ε0
i,w i t h¯ ε0
1 < ¯ ε1, ¯ ε0
2 > ¯ ε2 and π1¯ ε0
1 + π2¯ ε0
2 =¯ ε. From Jensen’s inequality, it is clear that
π1a0
1 + π2a0
2 >π 1a1 + π2a2 (aggregate demand increases with α for given p), so the asset price
has to increase to clear the market.
2 ε 1 ε
i ε
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of an increase in α on p
If we specialize preferences further by letting u(a)=a1−σ/(1 − σ) with σ>0, the model
21Gârleanu (2006) derives a similar result in a version of Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005) with endogenous
portfolios and CARA preferences.

















As a corollary of Proposition 2, we know that σ>1 (< 1)i m p l i e sdp/dα < 0 (> 0)a n d
u(a)=l o ga implies dp/dα =0 .
Finally, consider the limit as σ → 0, i.e., as investors’ preferences become linear. From (27),
the price approaches p =¯ εI/r and from (26) ai → 0 for i ∈ {1,...,I− 1} and aI → A/πI.T h e
price is a weighted average of the marginal utility of the highest investor type and the average
marginal utility in the market. The weight on the marginal utility of the highest valuation
investor–and hence the asset price–is increasing in α, β and r, and decreasing in η and δ.
4.2 Volatility
We now investigate how trading frictions aﬀect the volatility of asset prices. To this end,
we consider the model with aggregate uncertainty developed in Section 3.1 and let us
i (a)=
zsεia1−σ/(1 − σ) where zs is the realization of the aggregate shock, with zH >z L. Then,
Us
i (a)=¯ εs
iu(a),w h e r e¯ εs
i is independent of a.22 Consider an investor with idiosyncratic pref-
erence shock i at a time when the aggregate state is s; his optimal portfolio is as
i =( ¯ εs
i/ξs)1/σ
and the market-clearing condition implies
ξs =
"P






Consider ﬁrst the limit that obtains as trading delays vanish. As κ →∞ ,w eh a v e¯ εs
i → zsεi,




















r + κ + λ
¯ ε +
r + κ
r + κ + δ






r + κ + δ + λ
(εi − ¯ ε),
for s = H,L and s
0 ∈ {H,L}\{s}. Instead of considering aggregate preference shocks, we could assume that
the asset yields a dividend stream z,w h e r ez is a random variable. An investor holding portfolio a would enjoy
utility εiu(za) while his idiosyncratic preference type is i.
22for s = H,L and s0 ∈ {H,L}\{s}.
Let us return to the case with ﬁnite κ and set σ =1 . Using Lemma 4 and equations (22)




r(r+λ)A . The price of the asset in state s is independent of κ,
the degree of trading frictions and it is identical to the frictionless limit (29), with σ =1 .T h i s
ﬁnding is a generalization of the last part of Proposition 2 to economies with aggregate uncer-
tainty: with logarithmic utility and multiplicative shocks, equilibrium prices are independent
of trading frictions. Thus, in this case, trading frictions have no eﬀect on the volatility of the
asset price.
We use numerical simulations to study the eﬀect that changes in the degree of trading
frictions have on the volatility of the asset price for arbitrary values of σ.I n a s u ﬃciently
long sample from our economy, the asset price has mean
λLpH+λHpL






. From (29), in a frictionless economy the coeﬃcient of variation (standard








(r + λ)(λLzH + λHzL)
.
According to this measure, is the volatility of the asset price higher in an economy with trading
frictions?
To address this question we normalize zH =1 , and merely for illustrative purposes, we let
zL =1 /2 and λH = λL =1 /5. The remaining parameter values are as in Section 3.2. For this
parametrization, the ratio of the CV of the price in the economy with trading frictions to the
CV in the frictionless economy is below 1, meaning that the asset price is more volatile in the
frictionless economy than in the one with trading frictions. In fact, the asset price becomes
more volatile as trading delays shrink. This result, however, depends crucially on the curvature
of the utility function. To illustrate this fact, in Figure 5 we plot the level curves of the CV as
a function of σ and β for the baseline parametrization of Section 3.2. This ﬁgure shows that
the volatility of the asset price increases with β if σ>1, decreases with β if σ<1,a n di s
independent of β if σ =1 .23
23These results are mainly due to the fact that, in line with Proposition 2, the price of the asset in both
states–and hence the denominator of the CV–is decreasing (increasing) in β for σ>1 (< 1).
23Figure 5: Asset-price volatility as a function of β and σ
5 Trading frictions and volume
In this section we study the eﬀects of trading frictions on the asset allocation across investors
and the volume of trade. Let Gκ(a) denote the cumulative distribution of asset holdings across
investors in an economy in which they gain direct eﬀective access to the asset market at rate
κ. For a particular class of utility functions, the following proposition establishes that the
equilibrium distributions of asset holdings corresponding to diﬀerent values of κ can be ranked
according to the second-order stochastic dominance ordering.
Proposition 3 Assume ui(a)=εia1−σ/(1 − σ) with σ>0. For any pair (κ,κ0) such that
κ0 >κ , Gκ dominates Gκ0 in the second-order stochastic sense.
Proposition 3 shows that the distribution of asset holdings across investors becomes “riskier,”
in a second-order stochastic sense, when trading frictions are reduced (or when investors have
24more bargaining power). The reason, as discussed in the previous sections, is that if an investor
can access the market more frequently, he will choose a portfolio which is more in line with
his current preference type. Hence, investors with a high εi will raise ai while investors with a
low εi will reduce ai.W en o wt u r nf r o mt h ee ﬀects of trading frictions on the distribution of
individual portfolios to their eﬀects on the total volume of trade.
The ﬂow of investors who can readjust their portfolios per unit of time is α+β. A fraction
nji of these investors readjust their portfolio from aj to ai so that the quantity they trade is
|ai − aj|. Thus, the total volume of trade is:
V =( α + β)(1/2)
X
i,j
nij |aj − ai|. (30)
(The turnover rate of the asset is deﬁned to be T = V/A.) An increase in κ has three distinct
eﬀects on trade volume. First, the measure of investors in any individual state (i,j) ∈ I2 who
gain access to the market and are therefore able to trade increases, which tends to increase trade
volume. Second, the proportion 1−
P
inii of agents who are mismatched to their portfolio–and
hence the fraction of agents who wish to trade–decreases, which tends to reduce trade volume.
Finally, the distribution of asset holdings spreads out, which–according to Proposition 3–
tends to increase the quantity of assets traded in many individual trades. With (13) and (30),
it is easy to check that the ﬁrst two eﬀects combined lead to an increase in V.I nt h ec a s eI =2 ,
for example, it is also immediate from Proposition 3 that |a2 − a1| increases with κ, so the total
volume of trade unambiguously increases with κ. More generally, in our parametrization of
Section 3.2 with I =5 0 ,w ea l s oﬁnd ∂V/∂κ > 0. The behavior of the (daily) trade volume, V,
as a function of β is illustrated in the bottom-right panel of Figure 6.
6 Trading frictions and spreads
In this section we study how changes in trading frictions aﬀect intermediation fees, which we
can also interpret as bid-ask spreads.24 We specialize the analysis to ui(a)=εia1−σ/(1 − σ),
for σ>0. From (10), the equilibrium fee that a dealer charges an investor who holds portfolio













24Recall the discussion in Footnote 15.
25with ai and p given by (26) and (27). From (31), we see that an increase in β (or α)h a s
two opposite eﬀects on the intermediation fee. On the one hand, a higher β implies more
competition among dealers, which tends to reduce the fees they charge for any given trade
size–the competition eﬀect of reduced trading frictions. But on the other hand, a higher β
also induces investors to conduct larger portfolio reallocations every time they trade, and this
translates into larger fees for dealers, on average–the reallocation eﬀect of reduced trading
frictions. Notice that along a stationary equilibrium the only transactions that investors carry
out involve trading aj − ai,f o r(i,j) ∈ I2. Therefore, we can simplify notation by letting φij
denote φj (ai), namely the intermediation fee borne by an investor who holds portfolio ai and
engages in a trade that leaves him with aj.
Consider the limiting case σ → 0, i.e., investors’ preferences become almost linear. At the
end of Section 4.1 we showed that in this case ai → 0 for all i 6= I and rp → ¯ εI, so (31) yields
φij → 0 for all (i,j) / ∈ {I}×{ 1,...,I− 1}. Obviously, dealers obtain no fee when investors do
not want to readjust their portfolios. Perhaps more surprisingly, when investors are buying the
asset (i 6= I and j = I), dealers do not charge a fee either. The reason is that when buying, the
investor is paying his marginal valuation for the asset, and since he has almost-linear utility,
this means that he is indiﬀerent between holding or not holding the asset. Finally, there are
investors in state ij,f o ri = I and j 6= I. Those investors are holding aI → A/πI but wish to
hold aj → 0. From (31), we ﬁnd
φIj →
η(εI − εj)A
(r + δ + κ)πI
, (32)
a fee that is proportional to the quantity traded (A/πI).
Since the intermediation fee (32) is linear in the quantity traded, the previous results can
b er e a d i l yi n t e r p r e t e di nt e r m so fb i d - a s ks p r e a ds. The fact that an investor pays no fee when
buying from the dealer is equivalent to a transaction in which the dealer charges an ask-price
pa equal to the price of the asset in the competitive market, i.e., pa = p. When an investor
of type j<Isells his portfolio A/πI through a dealer, he receives pA/πI − φIj. Using (32),
this transaction is equivalent to one in which the dealer pays investors of type j ab i dp r i c e
pb
j = p −
η(εI−εj)
r+δ+κ <p . The diﬀerence between the eﬀective price at which the dealer sells, pa,
and buys, pb




r + δ + κ
.
26This spread is decreasing in the rate of time preference (recall that agents only get returns from
selling in this linear case), and in the rate at which investors can rebalance their portfolios (κ).
It also decreases with δ, since the value of rebalancing the portfolio is lower when preference
shocks are more frequent. The spread increases with the dealer’s bargaining power η,a n d
also with the diﬀerence between the marginal utility of the highest-valuation investor and the
marginal valuation of the investor involved in the trade. (Dealers buy assets at a lower eﬀective
price from investors with low marginal utility of consumption because these investors experience
larger gains from selling the portfolio.)
Although for more general (i.e., nonlinear) preferences intermediation fees are nonlinear
in the quantities traded, one can still compute the eﬀective prices that an investor pays (or
receives) per unit of the asset he buys (or sells). For example, investors with asset position ai
who trade quantity aj − ai through a dealer, pay (or receive if aj − ai is negative)
ˆ pij = p +
φij
aj − ai
per unit of the asset. The diﬀerence between the prices at which investors buy and sell are
sometimes taken as one measure of the liquidity of the market.25 Notice that if aj − ai > 0,
then ˆ pij − ˆ pji =
φij+φji
aj−ai > 0, so for this typical “round-trip” transaction, dealers (investors)
trade at a lower (higher) eﬀective price when they buy than when they sell. A ﬁnancial analyst
collecting transaction price data in this economy would compute an average eﬀective spread
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To illustrate the eﬀects of trading frictions on intermediation fees, we turn to our baseline
parametrization. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 6 displays φ1I and φI1 as a proportion of the equi-
librium asset price. The fee φ1I paid by the investor who holds a1 but wishes to trade up to aI
(the top line) is hump-shaped with respect to β. For small β the reallocation eﬀect dominates
and fees are increasing in β, but as β gets larger, the competition eﬀect between dealers begins
25See Harris (2003) for a textbook treatment, for example.










27to dominate, and the fee eventually becomes decreasing in β. In contrast, the fee φI1 is strictly
decreasing with β: the competition eﬀect always outweights the reallocation eﬀect. Also, notice
from the ﬁgure that buying and selling fees need not be symmetric, i.e., φ1I 6= φI1.
A dealer’s expected proﬁt depends on the average fee he charges across the various trades.
(This variable will play an important role when we endogenize the number of dealers in the
following section.) The average fee, ¯ φ, equals
P
i,j φijnij,o ru s i n g( 1 0 ) ,




Ui (ai) − Ui (aj)
r + κ
. (34)
Thus, ¯ φ depends on the mismatch between investors’ desired and their actual portfolios, as
measured by Ui (ai) − Ui (aj), as well as on the frequency with which investors gain access
to the asset market. More asset mismatch implies a larger expected return from providing
intermediation services. An increase in the frequency at which an investor can have direct
access to the market has several eﬀects on dealers’ proﬁts. First, it raises investors’ outside
option and therefore it reduces the fees dealers can charge in any given transaction. Second, it
reduces the measure of investors who do not hold their desired portfolios (i.e., nii increases for
all i). Third, it raises the dispersion of portfolios and therefore the fees that dealers can charge
to allow an investor to rebalance his portfolio. As a result, the average fee can be non-monotonic
as illustrated in the top-right panel of Figure 6, which reports ¯ φ (but normalized by the price of
the asset) as a function of β. For low values of β the dealers’ expected proﬁt increases because
the dispersion of portfolios increases as trading frictions are reduced. But for suﬃciently large
values of β the competition eﬀect dominates and the average remuneration of dealers falls. The
bottom-left panel of Figure 6 displays the average spread in (33), which is decreasing in β.
Finally, the bottom-right panel shows that trade volume as deﬁned in (30)–another variable
that practitioners routinely associate with the “liquidity of the market”–is increasing in β.
The theory also has clear predictions for how individual intermediation fees vary with the
size of a transaction. We summarize these implications in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider a trade between a dealer and an investor holding portfolio a and





¯ ¯ ¯, is increasing in the size of the trade.
28Figure 6: Trading frictions, intermediation costs and turnover
Figure 7 displays the fees per unit of asset traded for all the transactions that take place in
the baseline parametrization of Section 3.2. In other words, it plots all the pairs (aj − ai,φ ij)
I
j=1
for each i =1 ,...,I. As a corollary of Proposition 4, the intermediation fee per unit of asset
traded tends to increase with the size of the trade.27 Note however, that two trades of the
same size can pay diﬀerent per-unit fees since the associated surpluses for the investors may be
diﬀerent in the two trades. That is, in general, if ai 6= ak,t h e nφij 6= φks even if aj−ai = as−ak.
There is also an interesting asymmetry in terms of fees that are charged when investors buy
vis-à-vis those they are charged when they sell. For example, an agent who buys aI −a1 pays a
f e et h a ti sm o r et h a n2.5 times higher than the one the same dealer would charge to an investor
who sells aI − a1. Our analytical insights–e.g., that with linear preferences only sellers pay
27This result is in accordance with Boehmer (2005, Table 7, Panel B) who ﬁnds that the eﬀective spread
increases with the size of orders in U.S. equity markets. In contrast, Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2004) argue
that transaction costs decrease signiﬁcantly with trade size in corporate bond markets.
29Figure 7: Liquidity premia
fees–suggest that this asymmetry is intimately linked to the value of σ. Our quantitative work
conﬁrms this conjecture: keeping the size of the trade constant, for larger values of σ, buyers
pay larger fees than sellers.28
7E n t r y o f d e a l e r s
“In competitive dealer markets, dealer spreads ultimately depend on the costs
that dealers incur in running their business. The free entry and exit of dealers
ensures that spreads will adjust so that dealers just earn normal proﬁts. When
spreads are too high, their competition for order ﬂow will cause spreads to fall, and
as spreads fall, so do expected proﬁts.” Harris (2003, p. 298)
In this section we formalize the notion that a dealer’s expected proﬁts depend on the compe-
tition for order ﬂow that he faces from other dealers. Many dealer markets are characterized by
a virtual absence of barriers to entry.29 Accordingly, we extend the model to allow for free entry
28In terms of this asymmetry, there is nothing special about σ =1 . In fact, buyers pay higher fees than sellers
when σ =1in our baseline parametrization.
29See Wahal (1997) or Weston (2000) for an empirical study of the determinants of entry and exit of market-
makers in NASDAQ and their impact on spreads and the level of trading activity, e.g., trade volume and number
30of dealers, thereby endogenizing the speed at which investors can rebalance their portfolios.
Suppose that the Poisson rate at which an investor contacts a dealer, α, is a continuously
diﬀerentiable function of the measure of dealers in the market, υ,w i t hα(υ) a strictly increasing
and α(υ)/υ a strictly decreasing function of υ. We specify that α(0) = 0, α(∞)=∞ and
α(∞)/∞ =0 . Since all matches are bilateral and random, the Poisson rate at which a dealer
serves an investor is α(υ)/υ.F o rl a r g e rυ, investors’ orders are executed faster but the ﬂow of
orders per dealer decreases due to a congestion eﬀect.
There is a large measure of dealers who can choose to participate in the market. Dealers
who choose to operate incur a ﬂow cost γ>0 that represents the ongoing costs of running
the dealership, e.g., exchange membership dues, the cost of searching for investors, advertising
their services and so on. Free-entry implies
α(υ)
υ
¯ φ = γ, i.e., that the expected instantaneous








Ui (ai) − Ui (aj)
r + β + α(υ)(1− η)
= γ. (35)
A steady-state equilibrium with free entry is a list {(nij)
I
i,j=1 ,(ai,φ i (·))
I
i=1 ,p,υ} that sat-
isﬁes (9), (10), (13), (14), (15), and (35).
Proposition 5 Assume η>0. There exists a steady-state equilibrium with free entry of deal-
ers, and it has υ>0.
Proposition 5 establishes the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with free entry provided
dealers have some bargaining power. (If dealers had no bargaining power, intermediation fees
would equal 0 in every trade and dealers would be unable to cover their operation costs.) Our
proof of existence of a nontrivial equilibrium for η>0 relies on the properties of α(·).A st h e
measure of dealers becomes large, the instantaneous probability for a dealer to meet an investor
is driven to zero, and given that the cost to participate in the market is strictly positive, the
expected utility of a dealer becomes negative. Conversely, as the measure of dealers approaches
0, the rate at which a dealer meets an investor grows without bound and the expected proﬁto f
dealership becomes arbitrarily large. Consequently, since a dealer’s expected proﬁt is continuous
in the contact rate, there is an intermediate value of υ such that expected proﬁt equals 0.
of trades.
30Our free entry of dealers is analogous to the free entry of ﬁrms in Pissarides (2000). Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1987) also assume free entry of dealers (or middlemen), while Shevchenko (2004) has no entry but allows agents
to choose whether to become middlemen.
31Consider the limiting case where the dealer’s operating cost, γ, tends to 0. Since the average
fee ¯ φ is positive and bounded away from 0 for any α<∞ (see the proof of Proposition 5),
the free-entry condition (35) implies υ →∞ . This in turn implies that α →∞ ,s ot h es e a r c h
equilibrium converges to the frictionless competitive equilibrium we characterized in Section 3.




i (rp)=A, and the distribution of investors across asset holdings and preference
types is nii = πi for each i,a n dnij =0for j 6= i.
Next, we analyze two cases where the equilibrium with entry is unique. First, suppose









The second factor in (36) is the expected discounted utility gain that an investor of type i who
holds portfolio aj gets from trading ai − aj. The average fee is a weighted average of each of
these gains, with weights given by the proportion of agents of type i who hold portfolio j in the
stationary distribution (the ﬁrst factor in (36)). Since η =1implies that {Ui (·)} and {ai} are
independent of α, in this case the average fee only depends on α(υ) through the distribution
of investors, i.e., the “weights” in (36). As the number of dealers increases, a larger measure
of investors hold their desired portfolios, which reduces dealers’ opportunities to intermediate
trades. Thus, in this case, ¯ φ is strictly decreasing in α (and υ). Therefore, the left side of (35)
is strictly decreasing in υ, which implies uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium with entry.
From (35) with η =1 , we also obtain the following comparative static results: dυ/dγ < 0,
dυ/dβ ≷ 0, dυ/dδ ≷ 0. Higher operation costs reduce expected proﬁts, so fewer dealers choose
to operate. An increase in the rate at which investors get direct access to the asset market,
β, is ambiguous in general because of two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, the fact that
investors can trade more often without the need for a dealer reduces dealers’ market power,
and therefore also the average fee. This tends to reduce entry. On the other hand, as we saw
in Section 6, with higher β investors are able to rebalance their portfolios more frequently, and
as a result they choose more extreme asset positions. For dealers, more extreme asset positions
mean that on average they will earn higher intermediation fees. This tends to stimulate entry.
The eﬀect of an increase in δ on the measure of dealers is ambiguous for similar reasons.
In Figure 8 we report the behavior of the model with free entry and η =1 .E x c e p tf o rt h e
value of η, the rest of the parametrization is as in the baseline without free-entry. In addition,
32in this formulation we set α(υ)=υ0.75 and γ =0 .0001. The top-left panel displays the dealer’s
expected proﬁts net of the ﬂow cost, γ, illustrating the determination of the mass of dealers
for the economy with β =0 . In the top-right panel, the solid line traces out the equilibrium
measure of dealers as we vary β from 0 to 5. For relatively low values of β,a ni n c r e a s ei nβ raises
the measure of dealers. Over this range, allowing investors to have direct access to the market
increases dealers’ proﬁts and makes them more willing to operate in the market. As a result,
the rate at which investors contact dealers rises, as can be seen in the dashed line. For larger
values of β, both the equilibrium measure of dealers and the rate at which investors contact
dealers are decreasing in β. As a corollary, the bottom-left panel shows that for relatively low
values of β,i n c r e a s e si nβ can generate sharp reductions in the average execution delay, 1
α(υ)+β.
But for larger values of β, further increases in β crowd out dealers and can cause an increase
in the average execution delay.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 8 shows what happens to investors’ optimal portfolios (for
each level of the idiosyncratic shock εi)a sβ varies from 0 to 5.W h e nβ =0 , investors are able
to rebalance their portfolios very infrequently relative to the frequency of their idiosyncratic
shocks.31 In addition, since η =1in these experiments, investors get no surplus whenever
they reallocate their portfolio through a dealer, which together with β =0 , implies that κ =0 .
Hence, the optimal portfolio proﬁle is extremely ﬂat: when they make their portfolio allocation,
investors do not vary their portfolio choice much as a function of their current preference shock.
As β rises, each investor’s optimal portfolio proﬁle becomes steeper: he chooses to hold large
quantities of the asset when his current preference shock is high, and small ones when this
shock is low. This increase in portfolio dispersion means that investors trade large volumes on
average, and since fees are increasing in the size of the trade, this is what stimulates the entry
of dealers.
Next, we consider a second case in which the measure of dealers is uniquely determined.
Consider the limit as investors’ preferences become linear, ui (a) → εia. As in Section 4, let
ε1 <ε 2 <. . .<ε I, and recall that from (9), in this case only investors with the highest marginal
utility want to hold assets. In this limit, the average fee becomes
¯ φ =
ηδ(εI − ¯ ε)A
[β + δ + α(υ)][r + β + δ + α(υ)(1− η)]
.
31The condition β =0means that investors can never access the market directly, and from the top-left panel
we see that the equilibrium measure of dealers when β =0is very small, meaning that investors will have to
wait a long time to be able to rebalance their portfolio through a dealer.
33Figure 8: Model with entry of dealers and η =1
The average fee is decreasing in υ, so the left side of (35) is decreasing in υ and the equilibrium
is unique. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that ∂υ/∂γ < 0, ∂υ/∂η > 0, ∂υ/∂A > 0,
∂υ/∂r < 0, ∂υ/∂β < 0 and dυ/dδ ≷ 0. We discuss these results in turn.
Lower operation costs naturally imply more entry of dealers. Higher bargaining power for
dealers means that they can extract a larger share from the gains from trade in a meeting with
an investor, so the measure of dealers increases. Similarly, if the stock of assets increases, the
size of each trade is larger and dealers make more proﬁt. An increase in the discount rate
reduces the number of dealers because investors beneﬁt less from readjusting their portfolios,
and therefore intermediation fees are lower. (Recall that with linear preferences the gains from
holding a portfolio are “backloaded,” i.e., they only materialize when the portfolio is sold, and
higher r means these future gains are discounted more heavily.) An increase in β discourages
dealer entry because it strengthens the investor’s outside option and also reduces the degree of
mismatch between investors’ desired and actual portfolios. Finally, an increase in the frequency
of preference shocks has an ambiguous eﬀect on the equilibrium measure of dealers. On the one
hand, a higher δ generates more mismatch, which raises the return to intermediation. But on
34the other hand, since with larger δ preferences revert back to the mean marginal valuation ¯ ε
faster, an increase in δ lowers the expected utility of the highest-valuation investor relative to
the lower-valuation investors, which implies smaller gains from trade and consequently lower
intermediation fees.
So far, we have discussed two special cases for which the equilibrium with entry is unique.
But in general, the steady-state equilibrium with free entry need not be unique. An increase in
the number of dealers leads to an increase in α(υ). Faster trade means more competition among
dealers, which tends to reduce intermediation fees. But as we have pointed out, an increase in
α(υ) also induces investors to take on more extreme asset positions (i.e., more in line with their
current as opposed to the mean preference shock). This means that dealers will on average
intermediate larger portfolio reallocations, which implies larger fees, since fees are increasing in
the volume traded. The model will exhibit multiple steady states if the second eﬀect is strong
enough. (But for a given value υ, the rest of the equilibrium, {(nij),(φji),(ai),p)}, is uniquely




− ∑ ji ji n
) (
Figure 9: Multiple steady-state equilibria
In Figure 9 we provide a typical representation of a dealer’s expected proﬁt net of operation
32Notice that this type of multiplicity is new, and in fact, unlike the multiplicities in Diamond (1982) or
Vayanos and Weill (2005), it is present even though we did not embed thick-market eﬀects in our matching
technology. That is, by assuming that ∂ [α(υ)/υ] < 0, we in fact assume that dealers reduce the rate at which
other dealers contact investors. Thus, without the general equilibrium eﬀe c tt h a to p e r a t e st h r o u g ht h es h i f t si n
portfolio compositions, our equilibrium would be unique. If instead we assumed that for some reason dealers ﬁnd
it easier to contact investors when more dealers participate in the market, i.e., ∂ [α(υ)/υ] > 0, then the model




¯ φ−γ, as a function of the measure of dealers. As υ approaches 0 the contact rate of
d e a l e r sg o e st oi n ﬁnity while ¯ φ stays bounded away from 0. Therefore, dealers’ expected proﬁts
are strictly positive for small υ.A s υ goes to inﬁnity, the dealers’ expected proﬁts approach
−γ. Thus, there are generically an odd number of steady-state equilibria. We typically ﬁnd
either one or three equilibria in our numerical work.33 In case of multiple equilibria, the market
can be stuck in a low-liquidity equilibrium where few dealers enter and investors engage in
relatively small transactions. The low-liquidity equilibrium exhibits large spreads, small trade
volume and long trade-execution delays.
The high and low equilibria share the following comparative statics: a decrease in the
participation cost of dealers raises the measure of dealers in the market. If the decrease in the
participation cost is large enough, the multiplicity of equilibria can be removed. (The expected
proﬁts curve in Figure 9 shifts upward.) Similarly, an increase in β can eliminate the multiplicity
of equilibria. Thus, it is possible that if the economy was initially in the low equilibrium, an
increase in β generates a large upward jump in the measure of dealers. So allowing investors to
access the market directly need not crowd dealers out, in fact, it may even make intermediation
more proﬁtable.
To conclude the section, we want to argue that the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria
is a robust feature of our model provided that the elasticity of the matching function α(υ) is
suﬃciently close to one. This condition means that the marginal contribution of dealers to the
matching process is large, and congestion eﬀects on the dealer side are small. To see this clearly,
consider a linear matching function, α(υ)=α0υ,w i t hα0 > 0. (This matching technology does
not satisfy the assumption of strict concavity imposed earlier.) The rate at which dealers ﬁnd
orders to execute, α(υ)/υ, is independent of the measure of dealers in the market (there are no
congestion eﬀects). From the free-entry condition, υ =0if α0¯ φ<γ , υ = ∞ if α0¯ φ>γand
υ ∈ [0,∞] if α0¯ φ = γ. If the average fee ¯ φ(υ) is hump-shaped, as it was in the top-right panel
of Figure 6, for instance, the number of equilibria is either one or three. If there are multiple
equilibria, then one of those equilibria is υ =0 , as illustrated in Figure 10. Furthermore, for the
economy to reach the equilibrium with the highest number of dealers, there must be a critical
mass of dealers: dealers enter only if the measure of dealers is above a threshold. By reducing
t h ec o s to fd e a l e r s h i pγ, or by improving the eﬃciency of the matching technology α0,o n e
33Note that the low and high steady states in Figure 9 are “stable” in the following heuristic sence: if one
perturbates slightly the measure of dealers from its steady state value, free entry tends to bring the measure of
dealers towards its steady-state value.
36can eliminate the multiplicity and reach a situation in which the equilibrium with the highest




Figure 10: Free-entry with linear matching technology
8E ﬃciency
In this section we study the problem of a social planner who maximizes the expected discounted
sum of all agents’ utilities. When choosing allocations, the planner is subject to the same
frictions that investors and dealers face in the decentralized formulation studied in the previous
sections. Speciﬁcally, these frictions imply that over a small interval of time of length dt the
planner can only reallocate assets among a measure (α + β)dt of investors chosen at random
from the population. We will study eﬃciency in both, the model with a ﬁxed number of dealers
and the model with free entry of dealers.
8.1 Investors’ portfolios
Let Ht(a,i) denote the distribution of investors across portfolios and preference types at time t.
Since at any point in time all investors access the market according to independent stochastic
processes with identical distributions, the measure of assets that can be reallocated among the
α+β randomly-drawn investors is (α + β)
R
adHt(a,i)=( α + β)A. Thus, the quantity of assets
37that can be reallocated among investors depends only on the mean of Ht(a,i). Consequently,
the planner’s decision of how to allocate assets at time t aﬀects neither the measure of investors
he will draw in the future nor the total measure of assets that these investors hold. In other
words, Ht(a,i) is not a state variable for the planner’s problem.
The planner chooses among allocations {ai(t)}
I
i=1 that specify how to distribute the measure
(α + β)A of assets among the measure α+β of investors whose portfolios he can reallocate at
date t.L e t˜ Vi(a) denote the expected discounted utility of an investor of type i who holds stock







The expectation is over the random variables T and k,w h e r eT is the time until the investor
regains access to the asset market and k(τ) i st h ep r e f e r e n c et y p ea tt i m eτ,w h i c he v o l v e s
according to the stochastic process for idiosyncratic preference shocks. Note that–since the
stochastic processes for both random variables are stationary–the right-hand side of (37) is







˜ Vj(a) − ˜ Vi(a)
i
− (α + β)˜ Vi(a), (38)
and in turn, (38) implies
˜ Vi(a)=
(r + α + β)ui(a)+δ
P
j πjuj(a)
(r + α + β + δ)(r + α + β)
. (39)
Since general goods enter linearly in the utility function of all agents, the consumption and
production of those goods net out to 0 and can be ignored by the planner. Therefore, the
planner only maximizes the investors’ direct utilities from holding the asset. Given an initial









e−rt(α + β)ni(t)˜ Vi [ai(t)]dt
)
s.t. ˙ ni(t)=δ [πi − ni(t)],f o ri =1 ,...,I (40)
X
i
(α + β)ni(t)ai(t) ≤ (α + β)A, (41)
where Ψ0 ≡
R
i ˜ Vi(a)dH0(a,i).T h e t e r m Ψ0 captures the utility of all investors before they
access the marketplace for the ﬁrst time. This term is a constant because the planner can only
38reallocate assets among the α+β randomly-drawn investors who contact the marketplace. The
second term in the objective function states that over an interval of time of length dt,t h e r ei s
am e a s u r e(α + β)ni(t)dt of investors of type i who can have their portfolios rebalanced. An
investor of type i is assigned a portfolio ai(t). The planner’s choices are constrained by the
law of motion of the measure of investors of each preference type, (40), and must satisfy the
resource constraint (41). The following proposition characterizes the optimal allocation and
summarizes the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium of the model with a ﬁxed measure of
dealers.
Proposition 6 Consider the economy with an exogenous measure of dealers. Then:
(a) The eﬃcient allocation {ai(t)}
I
i=1 satisﬁes
(r + α + β)u0




r + α + β + δ
≤ λ(t),“ = ”i f ai(t) > 0, (42)
where λ(t) is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (41) scaled up by (r + α + β).
Let a∗




(1 − e−δt)πi + e−δtni(0)
i
a∗
i [λ(t)] = A (43)
at each date t.
(b) The equilibrium is eﬃcient if and only if η =0 .
The equilibrium with bargaining is eﬃcient if and only if dealers have no bargaining power.
This result may seem surprising given that the Nash solution implies eﬃcient trade for each
investor-dealer match. Speciﬁcally, recall that in the equilibrium, the portfolio implied by
the bargaining outcome maximizes the joint surplus of an investor and a dealer and it is in
fact the same portfolio that an investor would choose if he had direct access to the market.
The ineﬃciency arises from a standard holdup problem due to ex-post bargaining. When
conducting a trade, investors anticipate the fact that they will have to pay fees for rebalancing
their portfolios in the future and that these intermediation fees increase with the surplus that
those future trades generate. As a result, at the margin, investors are discouraged from taking
positions that tend to lead to large portfolio reallocations in the future. This ineﬃciency of
the equilibrium with bargaining gets mitigated as α or β increase, since subjecting dealers to
increased competition reduces transaction fees.
398.2 Entry of dealers
Finally, we investigate the eﬃciency properties of equilibrium with free entry of dealers. The
dynamic planner’s problem is now much more complex since the measure of dealers at any point
in time will typically depend on the whole distribution Ht(a,i), not just its mean. To keep the
analysis manageable, here we consider the case where the discount rate is close to 0, i.e., we
characterize the allocation chosen by a social planner who maximizes steady-state welfare. In









nijai = A,( 4 4 )
where the steady-state distribution {nij} satisﬁes (13) and (14). The planner maximizes the
population-weighted sum of investors’ utilities from holding the asset, net of the participation
costs of the dealers and taking into account that the stationary distribution {nij} depends on
the measure of dealers, υ.
Proposition 7 Consider the economy with free-entry of dealers and let r ≈ 0.T h e n :








α + β + δ





δπiπj [ui(ai) − uj(ai)]
α(υ)+β + δ
= γ, (46)
and (44), where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (44) scaled up by (α+β).
(b) An equilibrium with free-entry is eﬃcient if and only if η =0and α0(υ)υ/α(υ)=η.
As before, investors’ portfolios are eﬃcient if and only if dealers have no bargaining power.
Entry introduces an additional ineﬃciency: when a dealer enters the market, he imposes a
negative externality on other dealers’ order ﬂow. As it is well-known since Hosios (1990),
these search externalities are internalized if and only if the elasticity of the matching function
coincides with dealers’ bargaining power. If the Hosios condition α0(υ)υ/α(υ)=η holds, then
the equilibrium allocations can be made arbitrarily close to the eﬃcient allocations by making
η arbitrarily close to 0. But there is no free-entry equilibrium with η =0 , so an equilibrium
with entry is always ineﬃcient.
409C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed a simple search-theoretic model of the exchange process in an asset market.
The asset market we modelled captures the salient features of many ﬁnancial trades in various
contexts–and in particular of those carried out in over-the-counter markets. A fraction of
trades is intermediated by dealers who have access to an interdealer market, while the rest of
the trades are conducted directly between investors. In both cases ﬁnding a counterpart to
execute the trade entails delays. We have examined how these trading delays aﬀect the level
and volatility of asset prices, the size of bid-ask spreads, the volume of trade, the allocation of
assets across investors and the proﬁtability and participation decisions of dealers. As far as we
know, our analysis is one of the ﬁrst theoretical attempts to study the positive and normative
implications of the introduction of technological innovations in trading–such as electronic and
automated trading–that have increased the speed at which ﬁnancial transactions are matched
and executed.
From a methodological point of view, we have generalized the model of Duﬃe, Gârleanu
and Pedersen (2005) along several dimensions. We have relaxed the portfolio restrictions so
that investors can hold any nonnegative quantity of asset, extended the model to consider more
general preferences and more general forms of investor heterogeneity, allowed for idiosyncratic
as well as aggregate uncertainty, and granted investors direct, as well as indirect (i.e., dealer-
intermediated) access to a competitive market. We have also endogenized the provision of
liquidity by endogenizing the measure of dealers.
In terms of ﬁndings, we have shown that the level and volatility of the asset price need
not be aﬀected by the degree of the trading frictions; and that if they are, the sign of the
eﬀect depends on the curvature of the utility function. We have found that a reduction in
trading delays can increase the dealers’ average proﬁt despite the fact that, for a given trade
size, intermediation fees decrease with a reduction in trading delays. We have also shown
that there can be multiple equilibria in a version of the model where the measure of dealers
is endogenous. Equilibria with high asset turnover, narrow bid-ask spreads and high level of
participation of dealers can coexist with equilibria with low turnover, narrow spreads and longer
trading delays. We have also studied the model from a normative standpoint and found that
generically, equilibria are ineﬃcient. Investors’ portfolio choices are ineﬃcient because of a
holdup problem in their relationships with dealers. Entry of dealers is ineﬃcient because of a
41standard search externality.
By way of numerical simulations we have shown that while the model is stylized, it allows
for fairly general forms of investor heterogeneity and it has relatively few parameters that map
naturally into observables. One could imagine calibrating or estimating the model using data
on trade execution in over-the-counter markets. We think that much could be learned from such
exercises. For example, one could quantify the welfare gains associated with a given reduction in
trading frictions, or predict the impact that the introduction of electronic trading networks will
have on bid-ask spreads, average execution times, trade volume and other standard measures
of market liquidity. Various extensions are worth considering. First, there are many issues,
such as the dynamic provision of liquidity by dealers who can hold asset positions, that would
require a more detailed study of the model dynamics. Second, as an alternative to bilateral
bargaining, one could explore alternative trading mechanisms that combine price-posting and
directed search. Finally, a model with multiple assets could be used to study how the various
assets’ liquidity properties are jointly determined.
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46AA p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . The Nash solution requires the outcome to be Pareto eﬃcient. Since








.D i ﬀerentiating the Nash product in (3) with respect to φ and equating to
zero gives (5).
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Let S = R+×{1,...,I}, C = {g : S → R | g(a,i) is continuous in a
and bounded above} and C0= {f : S → R | f (a,i)=g (a,i)+pa,f o rs o m eg ∈ C}.D e ﬁne
v (a,i) ≡
Ui(a)−rpa
r+β+α(1−η) + pa. Note that our assumptions on ui imply that v (a,i) ∈ C0.N e x t ,
rewrite (6) as
Vi(a)=
Ui (a)+[ β + α(1 − η)](pa + ¯ Vi)




r + β + α(1 − η)
r + β + δ + α(1 − η)
max
x [Vi (x) − px]+
δ
r + β + δ + α(1 − η)
P
kπk max
x [Vk (x) − px]
for i =1 ,...,I. The right-hand side of (47) deﬁnes an operator T:
T(V )(a,i)= m a x
(xk)I
k=1
{v (a,i)+ˆ β[(1 − ˆ δ)[V (xi,i) − pxi]+ˆ δ
P
kπk [V (xk,k) − pxk]]}, (48)
with ˆ β =
β+α(1−η)
r+β+α(1−η),a n dˆ δ = δ
r+β+δ+α(1−η). We wish to show there exists a unique solution
V (a,i) to (TV)(a,i)=V (a,i),a n dt h a tV (a,i)=Vi (a),w i t hVi (a) as in (8). Suppose
V ∈ C0, then the maximization on the right-hand side of (48) has a solution, (aj)
I
j=1,a n dt h i s
solution is independent of a.T h u s , T(V )(a,i)=v (a,i)+ˆ βci,w h e r eci =( 1− ˆ δ)[V (ai,i) −
pai]+ˆ δ
P
kπk [V (ak,k) − pak] is a constant. Therefore T : C0 → C0. Consider the metric space
(C0,k·k),w h e r ek·k denotes the sup norm. We next show that T is a contraction on (C0,k·k).









V j (xk,k) − pxk
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} for j =1 ,2.F i x(a,i) ∈ S,t h e n




































































≤ ˆ β sup
(a,i)∈S
£
V 1 (a,i) − V 2 (a,i)
¤
≤ ˆ β sup
(a,i)∈S
¯ ¯V 1 (a,i) − V 2 (a,i)
¯ ¯ = ˆ β
° °V 1 − V 2° °.
47Similarly, we can obtain TV2 (a,i) − TV1 (a,i) ≤ ˆ β
°
°V 1 − V 2°
°.H e n c e ,
¯ ¯TV1 (a,i) − TV2 (a,i)
¯ ¯ ≤ ˆ β
° °V 1 − V 2° °, ∀(a,i) ∈ S.
Taking the sup over (a,i) on the left-hand side of this inequality, we get
° °TV1 − TV2° ° ≤
ˆ β
° °V 1 − V 2° °.S i n c eˆ β ∈ [0,1), T is a contraction with modulus ˆ β on C0.S i n c e (C0,k·k) is
complete (because (C,k·k) is complete), it follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem
(e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.2) that T has a unique ﬁxed point V ∈ C0.I ti sa
matter of algebra to use (48) to verify that indeed (TV)(a,i)=V (a,i) for V (a,i)=Vi (a)
given by (8).
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .From (11) and (12),
δπjni· − (α + β + δ)nij =0 , for j 6= i (49)
δπini· +( α + β)n·i − (α + β + δ)nii =0 , (50)
where ni· =
P
k nik and n·i =
P
k nki are the marginal distributions. Sum (49) over j,a n da d d
(50) to the resulting expression to get ni· = n·i. Then sum (49) over i, and add the resulting
expression to δπjnj·+(α+β)n·j =( α + β + δ)njj (this is (50), but with i = j)t og e tn·j = πj.
Thus, n·j = nj· = πj. Substituting these marginals into (49) and (50) yields (13) and (14).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .The steady-state distribution (nij)
I
i,j=1 is unique and given by (13)
and (14). From (9), any interior portfolio choice ai is a strictly decreasing function of p for
every i. Therefore, the market-clearing condition (15) determines a unique p.G i v e np,t h e r ei s
a unique ai that solves (9). Finally, given p and ai, (10) gives the fee φi (·) for each i.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . From (17), we see that the model is formally equivalent to one where
investors have eﬀective direct access to the asset market with Poisson rate κ.U s i n g t h i s
observation, the V s







k(t)(a)dt + e−rT max
a0 [V
w(T)
k(T) (a0) − pw(T)(a0 − a)]
¾
, (51)
where w(t) ∈ {H,L} denotes the aggregate state, and k(t) ∈ {1,2,...,I} the investor’s prefer-
ence type at time t. In (51), T is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 1/κ,
that denotes the period of time that elapses until the investor gains direct eﬀective access to
the market. The expectations operator, E, is with respect to the random variable T and the
48two independent Poisson processes {w(x),k(x)}, and is conditional on (w(0),k( 0 ) )=( s,i).W e
now proceed to simplify (51). First, notice that (51) can be rewritten as
V s
i (a)=˜ V s
i (a)+E[e−rTpw(T)]a + ∆s
i, (52)






i = Ee−rT maxa0[V
w(T)
k(T) (a0) − pw(T)a0]. Using (52),




i], can be written as
max




− [ps − E(e−rTpw(T))]a0}. (53)
The expectation in (53) is over the random variables T and w(T), conditional on the current
aggregate state, s. Next, we proceed in two steps: (i) derive a simpler expression for ˜ V s
i (a),




(i). The value ˜ V s







k (a) − ˜ V s
i (a)] + λs[˜ V s0
i (a) − ˜ V s
i (a)] − κ˜ V s
i (a).












(r + κ + λs0
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r + κ + λ
#
, (55)






i) − [rps −
κλs




which is identical to (18) once we let rps − κλs
r+κ+λ(ps0
− ps)=ξs.










From (25), we know that the denominator of this expression is strictly positive, so we focus on
the sign of the numerator. Diﬀerentiating (25) to obtain ∂ai/∂α, multiplying by πi, and adding














(εi − ¯ ε)πi.
49Suppose −[u0(a)]
2 /u00(a) is strictly increasing in a.L e t ¯ a denote the a that solves (25) for
¯ εi =¯ ε. Then, note that −[u0(ai)]
2 (εi − ¯ ε)/u00(ai) ≥−[u0(¯ a)]
2 (εi − ¯ ε)/u00(¯ a) for each i,w i t h




∂απi > 0 and consequently,
dp
dα > 0. Similar
reasoning implies
dp
dα < 0 if −[u0(a)]




is constant in a.
i π





Figure 11: Distribution of asset holdings
P r o o fo fP r o p o s t i o n3 .L e t ai (κ) denote the individual demand for the asset by an agent
whose current preference shock is εi in an economy where the direct eﬀective access rate to the









Then, one can verify that there exists a unique ˜ ε ∈ (ε1,ε I) such that ai (κ0) >a i (κ) for all εi > ˜ ε,
ai (κ0) <a i (κ) for all εi < ˜ ε and ai (κ0)=ai (κ) ≡ ˜ a if εi =˜ ε. With Lemma 3, the cumulative
distribution of assets across investors for the economy indexed by κ,i sGκ(a)=
P
j 1{aj(κ)≤a}πj.
T h i s ,a n dt h ef a c tt h a t(κ0 − κ)[ai (κ0) − ai (κ)] > 0 iﬀ εi > ˜ ε implies that Gκ0(a) ≥ Gκ(a) for
all a<˜ a and Gκ0(a) ≤ Gκ(a) for all a>˜ a. Thus, given that both densities have the same mean
50and aI (κ0) >a I (κ), the fact that the cumulative density functions cross only once implies that
Gκ dominates Gκ0 in the second-order stochastic sense. (Propostion 3 is illustrated in Figure 11,
where we represent the distribution associated with κ in black and the distribution associated
with κ0 in grey.)









r + β + α(1 − η)
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Ui (ai) − Ui (a) − U0





Thus, the intermediation fee per unit of asset traded is increasing in the size of the trade if and
only if Ui is concave.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .Using (7), we can write (34) as
¯ φ =
ηδ
(β + δ + α)[r + β + δ + α(1 − η)]
X
i,j
πiπj [ui (ai) − ui (aj)].
From (9) we know that ai is a continuous function of υ and p,i . e . ,ai = ai (υ,p). From (15), there
is a unique p that clears the asset market and it is a continuous function of υ, i.e., p = p(υ).




i,j πiπj {ui[ai(υ)] − ui[aj(υ)]}
[β + δ + α(υ)][r + β + δ +( 1− η)α(υ)]
. (56)
This is the left-hand side of the free-entry condition (35). First, we establish that limυ→0 Γ(υ)=
∞.R e c a l lt h a t


















r + δ + κ
− rpaj (57)
holds for every i and j. Since (9) implies ai = aj if and only if ai = aj =0 , (57) holds with
strict inequality for any i such that ai > 0. Multiplying this inequality through by πiπj and
summing over all i and j implies
P
i,j πiπj {ui[ai(υ)] − ui[aj(υ)]} > 0. The inequality is strict
since for every υ we have ai > 0 at least for i = I. Then, limυ→0 Γ(υ)=∞ follows from η>0




[β + δ + α(υ)][r + β + δ +( 1− η)α(υ)]
= ∞.
51Next, note that the fact that
P
i,j πiπj {ui[ai(υ)] − ui[aj(υ)]} is bounded (because ai(υ) must




[β + δ + α(υ)][r + β + δ +( 1− η)α(υ)]
=0
implies that limυ→∞ Γ(υ)=0 . Finally, since Γ is continuous, there exists some υ ∈ R+ such
that Γ(υ)=γ.
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ui[ai(t)] +
δ
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δ









where λ(t) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint. The planner’s
problem then reduces to ﬁnding, for each t, the sequence {ai(t)}
I
i=1 that solves max{ai(t)} L(t).
The ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient condition for this problem is (42). Condition (43) is ob-
tained by substituting the solution to the diﬀerential equation (40) into the resource constraint
(41) at equality. This concludes the proof of part (a). For part (b), note that from (43), as






i (λ) is the ai that satisﬁes (42). Comparing (58) with (15), (42) with (9), and setting
rp = λ, it becomes clear that (9) coincides with (42) if and only if η =0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .The Lagrangian associated with this problem is
L =
α + β





α + β + δ
X
i,j








where λ ∈ R+ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint
P
i,j nijai = A.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ai is
α + β








k(ai) ≤ λ,“ = ”i f ai > 0. (59)
52As r → 0, the left-hand side of (9) approaches
β + α(1 − η)









which coincides with the left-hand side of (59) if and only if η =0 .T h eﬁrst-order condition
for the measure of dealers is
α0 (υ)
β + δ + α(υ)
X
i,j
δπiπj [ui(ai) − uj(ai)]
β + δ + α(υ)
= γ. (60)
From (56) we know that, as r → 0, the equilibrium condition for entry of dealers approaches
[α(υ)/υ]η
β + δ +( 1− η)α(υ)
X
i,j
δπiπj [ui (ai) − ui (aj)]
β + δ + α(υ)
= γ,
which converges to (60) as η → 0 if and only if α0(υ)υ/α(υ)=η.
53